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COMMENTS1
THE "NEW DIRECTIONS" FOR PRIORITY RIGHTS
IN BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS
Walter J. Blum *

T

AKING advantage of a temporary calm in the field of corporate reorganization principles and practices, De Forest
Billyou in his recent article in this Review, "Priority Rights of
Security Holders in Bankruptcy Reorganization: New Directions," ' takes stock of where our priority doctrines stand today.
His main observation is arresting and provocative. He labels
"unsound" the familiar distinction between the priority rights of
security holders in bankruptcy reorganization and in reorganization under Section ii of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act 2 and argues that on a proper reading of the Supreme Court
precedents investment value as a priority theory is "not limited
in application to Section ii proceedings, but is equally applicable
in bankruptcy reorganization." ' He further argues that bankruptcy reorganizations would be fairer to junior security holders
and quicker if they were governed by the investment value theory.
In brief, Billyou would change accepted reorganization doctrines
by no longer treating liquidation preferences as matured in bankruptcy reorganization.
While it is uncertain how much effect legal theory has in hammering out reorganization plans, there can be no doubt that
theory tends to limit the area within which the negotiation of
reorganization settlements takes place. And in view of the central position occupied by priority theory in reorganizations, the
need for subjecting the "new directions" to close scrutiny becomes strong enough to require comment. Even though another
rash of bankruptcy reorganizations accompanying a future de* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B.A., University of Chicago, 1939, J.D., 1941. The author wishes to acknowledge his opportunity to read
Mr. Billyou's reply, infra p. 1379, in manuscript form.
" 67 HARv. L. REV. 553 (1954).
2Id. at 585. 49 STAT. 820 (1935), I5 U.S.C. § 79k (1946).
a Billyou, supra note I,at 584.
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flation probably would in time work changes in priority doctrines,
the new very likely would build upon the old. Thus it is still
worthwhile to reassess the old, especially at a moment of tranquility in reorganization law.
Billyou lays the foundation for his analysis of priority doctrines by emphasizing that priority, when associated with reorganizations, has two equally important aspects. "One aspect is
the concern of priority with the identification, the construction,
and the evaluation of a security contract." I The function of
priority here is to determine what features of the old security
contracts are to be accorded significance in the reorganization.
The second aspect, which comes into play only after all issues
under the first have been settled, "is concerned with the form or
the amount of participation or compensation that is to be
awarded in recognition of those features of the particular security contract that are to be accorded significance." ' There is a
close interrelationship between these aspects of priority in that
((variations in the standards as to the form or amount of participation and compensation can modify the effect of any standards
established for identifying and evaluating the security contract." 6
From the vantage point of this distinction Billyou reviews the
main reorganization precedents, observing that the distinction
has not always been recognized or preserved. In his survey he
points up the emergence of two competing theories. One, "relative" priority, "would preserve for creditors a claim on the income of the reorganized company equal to the old income claim
as well as retaining in the new capital structure rights on dissolution equal to the old claim for principal." 7 The other, "absolute"
priority, "would require that old creditors receive, in the order of
their legal priorities and before junior security holders might participate, new securities whose fair cash market value would
roughly equal their dollar claims." 8 These are the classical meanings of the terms "absolute priority" and "relative priori~y" that
have figured so prominently in the law and language of reorganization. While they could be understood to refer in part to both
aspects of priority, they have often been thought to pertain
4 Id. at

566.

Ibid.
6

Id. at 566-67.
Id. at 559.
8
Ibid.
7
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primarily if not exclusively to the second aspect -the
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form or

amount of compensation.
The development of this aspect of priority in statutory reorganizations is easily extracted from Billyou's presentation. In
industrial bankruptcy reorganizations the SEC has consistently
advocated that the statutory standard of a fair and equitable plan
calls for application of the absolute priority theory, and this view
has been accepted by the Supreme Court in the few industrial
reorganization cases in which it has expressed itself on the question. In railroad bankruptcy reorganizations the ICC and the
Supreme Court both have talked in terms of adhering to absolute
priority, but the approved plans contain allocations that give
senior security holders substantially less compensation than
called for by absolute priority in the classical sense. In Section
ii public utility reorganizations this second aspect of priority
has not been discussed "because the SEC in Section ii cases has
never authorized the retirement of debt securities for payment
in cash in an amount less than, or by the allocation of securities
having a market value less than, the face amount and accrued
interest of the security being retired." '
The development of the first aspect of priority - the evaluation of the contract- is somewhat more difficult to trace from
Billyou's treatment of the precedents. In the Los Angeles Lumber
case 'o the Supreme Court condemned a composition-type settlement in an industrial reorganization under the fairness requirement and called for adherence to the rule of "absolute priority."
It is not clear whether Billyou thinks that the opinion overlooked
the first aspect of priority entirely or that the Court was aware
of it but did not discuss the basis for the result reached in the
case." He does, however, criticize the SEC for its later intimation that the determination of rights to be accorded significance
in a reorganization precedes application of the "absolute priority
rule" announced in the Los Angeles Lumber case, and therefore
could not be controlled by it. 2 Not until the SEC turned to Section ii reorganizations did it recognize that this first issue was
0 Id. at 58o.
'0 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. io6 (i939).
" It is possible to read Billyou as implying that the Court completely overlooked the first aspect of priority inasmuch as it did not expressly concern itself
with the fact that the security in question was a bond that was not due and was
secured by a mortgage that could not be foreclosed. Billyou, supra note i, at 579.
12 Id. at 579 n.84.
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an aspect of priority, and then it took the lead in convincing the
Supreme Court that no particular feature of a contract, such as
a liquidating preference, should be decisive, but instead that the
contract should be appraised in the light of all its investment
features to arrive at its "investment value." But for some reason, which Billyou seems at a loss to explain, the SEC sought to
reinforce this position by inviting a comparison: "Contrast cases
dealing with matured (or provable as if matured) debt claims in
bankruptcy reorganizations, where the only right to be dealt with
and accorded full priority is the right to receive the face amount
of the debt claim." '" And once the investment value doctrine
had been sanctioned for Section ii reorganizations by the Supreme Court in the Otis case,'1 4 the SEC, along with most courts,
went right on assuming that it had no bearing on priorities in
bankruptcy reorganizations. It is this attitude of the SEC which
Billyou characterizes as a "willingness to disregard history" as
well as a "willingness to disregard substantial evidence that the
Supreme Court recognizes its Section ii precedents to be part of
the same body of doctrine as its bankruptcy reorganization precedents." 15

These are the conclusions which call for examination.
Billyou distinguishes bankruptcy reorganization (and its ancestor, equity receivership reorganization) from straight bankruptcy proceedings on the ground that the former aims to
preserve values for investors by maintaining the distressed organization as a going concern instead of allowing it to be liquidated to satisfy claims of creditors. In this he is historically
correct. The basis of his contention that the SEC has disregarded
history is its assertion, in support of its position that in bankruptcy reorganization creditors' rights are to be dealt with as if
in liquidation, that "bankruptcy reorganization is a substitute
for liquidation . . . ,,11 But this assertion does not imply that

in any particular case there is a valid choice between reorganization and liquidation. In the case of most large enterprises in financial distress, liquidation is clearly not a practical alternative,
and for publicly held corporations in general there probably
never was a time when liquidation could be so considered. The
13 American Power & Light Co., 21

S.E.C. 191, 197 n.i3 (1945).

Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (I945).
MBillyou, supra note x,at 583.
'0 Id. at 58,.
"4
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real choice is between doing something affirmative to enforce the
creditors' rights and holding them off entirely - between enforcement and moratorium. Both liquidation and reorganization
are methods of enforcing those rights. To speak of reorganization as a substitute for liquidation is not to deny this proposition
but rather to affirm it by indicating that enforcement of creditors'
rights is to take place through reorganization, which preserves
values, instead of through liquidation, which tends to destroy them.
Surely there is nothing in this relationship which suggests that in
reorganization creditors' claims should be evaluated differently
than in liquidation. On the contrary, it strongly suggests that the
two modes of enforcement call for similar evaluations.
The disregard of Supreme Court decisions which Billyou imputes to the SEC is on equally tenuous ground. Paradoxically he
seeks to derive the strongest support for his conclusion from a
sentence in the Otis opinion - the very opinion that gave the
investment value doctrine its status in Section ii reorganizations: "Creditors' contracts also have been declared subject to
equitable adjustment in corporate reorganizations so long as they
receive 'full compensatory treatment' whether the reorganization
is in bankruptcy . . . or in compliance with regulatory stat-

utes." 17 Alongside this statement he places an excerpt from the
Court's earlier opinion in the bankruptcy reorganization of the
Milwaukee Road in which it is said: "It is sufficient that each
security holder in the order of his priority receives from that
which is available for the satisfaction of his claim the equitable
equivalent of the rights surrendered. That requires a comparison
of the new securities allotted to him with the old securities which
he exchanges to determine whether the new are the equitable
equivalent of the old." 18 On first impression these statements
and other similar ones appear to mean that the Court considers
the investment value theory as applying equally to all reorganizations. A more critical reading of them in their context and historical setting, however, is likely to result in a wholly different
interpretation.
The phrase quoted from the Otis opinion concerning full compensatory treatment for creditors, and the language in the Milwaukee opinion calling for security holders to receive in the order
1 323 U.S. at 634 n.14.

18 Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S.
523, 565-66 (1943).
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of their priorities the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered, have a common ancestor. Both can easily be traced back
to the Supreme Court opinion in the Consolidated Rock casean industrial bankruptcy reorganization. 9 There, in talking
about the need for full compensatory treatment of creditors and
the propriety of offering new securities of a value equal to the
creditors' claims, the Court clearly was addressing itself not to
the first aspect of priority- evaluating the features of security
contracts to be given significance in the reorganization- but to
the second. The Court was concerned with the form or the
amount of compensation to senior security holders, a point which
Billyou himself explicitly makes,20 and its language was intended
to convey the thought that the amount of compensation did not
have to be stated in dollar terms or be in the form of securities
superior to those given junior claimants. On this subject the
Court climaxed its discussion by saying: "Practical adjustments,
rather than a rigid formula, are necessary. The method of effecting full compensation for senior claimants will vary from case to
case. .

.

. [W]hether in case of a solvent company the creditors

should be made whole for the change in or loss of their seniority
by an increased participation in assets, in earnings or in control,
or in any combination thereof, will be dependent on the facts and
requirements of each case. So long as the new securities offered
are of a value equal to the creditors' claims, the appropriateness
of the formula employed rests in the informed discretion of the
court." 21

There is no need to speculate whether in using this language
the Court intended to concern itself at all with the first aspect of
priority. The Court dealt with that subject in another part of the
opinion, and made it plain that the statutory standard of fairness
in industrial bankruptcy reorganizations required treating claims
of creditors as if matured. "The instant plan runs afoul of [the
absolute priority] principle," it concluded, because "no provision
19 Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (194i). The same
is true of similar language quoted by Billyou from the Engineers case, SEC v.
Central-llinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 143 (i949), and from the Niagara
Hudson case, Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336i 347-48
(i95i), as additional authority for his assertion that the Supreme Court considers
the investment value theory as applying to all reorganizations. Billyou, supra
note20i, at 584.
d. at 568.
21312 U.S. at 529-30.
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is made for the accrued interest on the bonds. This interest is
entitled to the same priority as the principal." 22 To dispel any
doubts as to the sense in which the term "priority" is here used,
the Court cited as authority two cases holding that in receiverships, as in bankruptcies, "a secured creditor . . . may enforce

his lien against his security, where it is sufficient to cover both
principal and interest, until his claim for both is satisfied." 23
Thus, reading the language common to the Milwaukee and Otis
opinions in the light of its forerunner in the Consolidated Rock
case, there is no ground for believing the Court was introducing
the investment value theory into bankruptcy reorganization.
What the Court was saying is that the different kinds of reorganization are alike in that the standard of fairness as to the form
and amount of compensation to holders of senior securities is the
same in all reorganizations. For a plan to be fair, seniors must
get the equivalent of those features of their security contracts
which are entitled to be accorded significance in the reorganization.
Whether or not Billyou is correct in his interpretation of reorganization history and Supreme Court precedents, there is still
the question whether on the merits of the issue the claims of
senior security holders should be treated as matured in a bankruptcy reorganization. On this question Billyou offers arguments
on what he terms the theoretical and the practical levels for not
regarding the claims as matured. Once again his presentation
invites rejoinder to the main arguments in behalf of his position.
On the theoretical level he underscores the fact that to treat
liquidation preferences as matured can result "in some security
holders receiving a participation in the reorganized enterprise
which they could not receive in any proceeding othe than actual
liquidation." 4 His argument against permitting this is stated
forcefully: "To arrive at such results in proceedings whose very
purpose is to enable an enterprise to continue in order to preserve
legitimate security interests is hardly an effectuation of the promises made to corporate security holders and on which their
investments were presumably made." 2 This statement truly
22

23

Id. at 527.
Ticonic Nat. Bank v. Sprague, 303 U.S. 4o6, 413 (1938).

The other case

cited was American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.,
266-67 (1914).
24

25

Billyou, supra note x, at 586.
Ibid.
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goes to the heart of the matter. The central issue of fairness in a
bankruptcy reorganization concerns the degree to which the
spirit, if not the letter, of security contracts can be ignored or
overridden by a majority -

but not all -

of the security holders

involved.
Because reorganization, as a substitute for liquidation, was
shaped to preserve values for investors, it does not follow that
reorganization was designed to preserve values for junior claimants at the expense of senior claimants. Billyou seems to say that
in ascertaining the amount of value to which seniors have a right,
the liquidation preferences in their security contracts should not
be controlling since these do not accord with the legitimate expectations of the various groups as to their respective interests
in a continuing enterprise. 6 This is the basis of his theoretical
argument for applying the investment value theory in bankruptcy reorganization. But since he does not purport to have
conducted his own survey of investors, and since there is no organized body of knowledge about investor expectations, his
premise may be questioned. As to large institutional investors,
who might be expected to rely on the frequently repeated views
of the courts and the SEC, any expectation would probably coincide with the accepted understanding of the existing state of the
law. As to other investors, who are not likely to be familiar with
reorganization law, it is reasonable to suppose that those who
invest in common shares expect to bear the risk of loss in case of
a financial debacle, and that those who invest in senior securities
expect to have the protection of the equity cushion when the
going gets rough. When all is said and done, it appears likely
that uppermost in the minds of most investors who purchase
comparatively low-yielding senior securities is protection against
disaster. The distinction between debt and equity may be becoming blurred, but to the extent that it retains vitality it seems
to be associated with the notion of ultimate risk.
This, of course, is not to argue that private senior security
holders have precise expectations concerning their default rights.
Rather it is to emphasize that rights on default very likely figured
heavily in their choice of senior instead of junior securities. In
26 Ibid.
27

This argument applies to all types of senior securities, including preferred

shares. Its force perhaps is less in the case of preferred shares than debentures or
bonds, but the direction of its thrust is the same.
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the case of bonds an important default right is priority as to accrued interest as well as principal; in the case of cumulative
preferred shares an important catastrophe right is preference for
dividend arrears as well as for the stated liquidation preference.
To refuse to treat such crisis rights as matured in a reorganization which is a substitute for liquidation is to make substantial
inroads on the bundle of rights for which the senior investors
bargained. When disaster occurs, and the bargained-for protection is sought, is it fair to respond that the distress features are
only a part of the contract and that the contract should be
viewed as a whole?
On the practical level, Billyou's main argument for applying
the investment value theory to the second aspect of priority is
at once the most interesting and the most baffling portion of his
article. He notes that in the bankruptcy reorganization of certain railroads, "[i]n no meaningful sense did the new securities
issued under those . . . plans represent 'full payment' of the

claims they purported to satisfy." 28 He then states that on balance, "[t]he effect of the emphasis of bankruptcy priority theory
on the amount of the debt claim has been largely nullified by
the character of the securities issued in recognition of such a
claim." 29 These reflections may seem somewhat unrelated to the
investment value standard, but Billyou makes clear the connection he has in mind. "The emphasis of the investment value
theory on all of the investment features of the security contract
would result in some attention being given to such features of the
security contract as the earning coverage of the old bonds and
the underlying security, as well as the financial weakness of the
enterprise." 3
The desire of Billyou to have attention focused on the factors
he enumerates, at the time of determining the form or amount of
compensation to be given the various classes of participating security holders, merits enthusiastic endorsement. But this is not
a function of the investment value theory. That theory is significant only in its application to the first aspect of priority - the
identification and evaluation of the features in security contracts
to be accorded significance in a reorganization. As to the other
aspect, there is nothing in the nature of the investment value
28
2

Billyou, supra note z, at 589.
59o.

9 Id. at

3

o Ibid.
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theory which calls for following a process divergent from that
which the SEC and Supreme Court are generally thought to have
prescribed for bankruptcy reorganization. This is well-demonstrated by the lineage of the "full compensatory treatment" and
"equitable equivalent" language of the Court, which, as shown
before, can be traced from Consolidated Rock, through Milwaukee, to the Otis and Engineers cases. In the light of this history,
it is practical and sound to view the investment value theory as
relating solely to the first aspect of priority.
Billyou's position, moreover, greatly underplays the actual
facts of the situation. The undercompensation of senior security
holders in railroad bankruptcy reorganizations, as contrasted with
the adequate compensation of seniors in Section ii reorganizations, is not to be explained by any failure to consider all the features of the investment contracts involved. The ICC and no doubt
the Supreme Court were fully aware that unless the fortunes of
railroads improved tremendously, many senior security holders
would be getting considerably less than genuinely full compensatory treatment while juniors were being allowed to participate in
the reorganized companies. No additional amount of contract
analysis could or would have changed this. The railroad industry
had been overcapitalized, it had been overcontrolled by the Government, it had almost never earned a favorable return on capital
invested in it, and it had suffered a severe and long depressionY1
Under the circumstances it is somewhat surprising that the ICC
was able to cut off in reorganization as many classes of security
holders as it succeeded in doing; it simply was not in the cards to
make a deeper incision. The atmosphere surrounding the Section ii public utility reorganizations was incomparably different.
The utility industry had fared far better than most other industries during the great depression, the operating companies were
returning satisfactory profits on invested capital, and the market
3zBELLEMORE, INVEST

sMENS
-PINTCIES

PRACTCES Am

ANALYSIS 633-34

(1953):
For the period from 1926 to I945 inclusive the railroads earned an average
of 3.54% of their investment compared with 6.3o% earned by electric utility companies in the same period. Since 1930 it has been virtually impossible for railroads
to sell additional stock. From 1938 to date 99% of all new issues sold have been
in the form of bonds and z% in stocks. If the railroad industry can only earn a
maximum of less than 6% in its best years and does much worse than that in its
poor years the industry can expect little more than casual interest from investors
if it attempts to market new issues of equity securities for investment purposes.
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doldrums.. 2

Under
for their securities by and large was not in the
the circumstances the SEC in its public utility work could afford
to talk about present values; the ICC was practically forced to
dodge direct discussion of present values and instead indulge in a
kind of double talk which tended to obscure the embarrassing
dilemma with which it was faced.
The importance of the distinction between present valuesthat is, market values -

and presumed future values -

that is,

reorganization values - is not confined to the railroad end of
bankruptcy reorganizations. At least in time of widespread economic depression, the reorganization of distressed companies could
go forward only if enterprise valuations departed from valuations
of the market place. It is true that immediately after the Supreme
Court in the Consolidated Rock case ordained that seniors were
entitled to full compensation, several distinguished reorganization lawyers said in print that seniors should be given "new securities with a market value equal to the full amount of their respective claims."" In retrospect it is hard to explain these extreme
statements inasmuch as those who were actively participating in
reorganization settlements must have known that in depressed
times such strict foreclosure of junior interests was unacceptable
and unworkable. Perhaps the best explanation is that the Consolidated Rock decision occurred after there had been a fair degree of general economic recovery. Be that as it may, what calls
for comment here is the fact that Billyou lumps together these
extreme "market value" statements and the parallel but significantly different position taken by the SEC. It was the SEC's view
that "senior securityholders are entitled to receive more than
mere paper securities of a face amount equal to their claims.
32

1d.at 582:

The utility industry as a whole has proved to be one of the most stable
segments of American industry. During the severe depression of the early 1930's,
drastic losses were suffered by many holding companies largely as the result of
past financial manipulation. In direct contrast, the operating companies displayed
notable stability. This stability was again brought to the attention of investors
in the recession year, 1938. Phenomenal growth has taken place since 1940,
Consequently, the securities of the industry have become the most widely accepted quality stable investments of all private capital securities. The wide acceptance has been especially marked among institutional investors, investors acting in
a fiduciary capacity, and other investors who follow conservative policies either
through necessity or wish. There are, of course, poor and medium quality securities in the group, but it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to point to
any other group of private securities that have achieved the investment stature or
acceptance that has been accorded those in the electric power industry. They are
considered the best of defensive securities and many show growth.

" Dean, A Review of the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 26 CoRNELL L.Q.
537, 559 n.63 (1941) (emphasis original). See Billyou, supra note i, at 565-66.
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. . . In other words, the new securities should be intrinsically
sound, so that there is a reasonable prospect that they will have
values equal to their face amounts, or in the case of stocks, equal
to the values put upon them for reorganization purposes."" 4 This
statement holds the key to the real difference between the form or
amount of compensation for claims - the second aspect of priority - in bankruptcy reorganizations under depression conditions and in Section i i public utility reorganizations. In the latter
it was reasonable and practical to insist that senior security holders in healthy utility companies be given full compensation in
terms of present market values of securities. In the former such
a course was usually out of the question.
An exception very conveniently illustrates this point. Billyou
comments: "In some instances new securities distributed to security holders pursuant to SEC-approved Chapter X plans have
had cash market values equal to their par values; witness the
securities issued pursuant to the plan approved in Central States
Elec. Corp. v. Austrian ..

. ."

3' However the Central States

reorganization 36 was atypical. The plan of reorganization was
drawn during generally prosperous times and, of equal significance, the corporation was a holding company owning securities
whose immediate market values could be ascertained with comparative ease. Under these circumstances it would have been awkward, to say the least, for the SEC to contend that the value of
the holding company exceeded the present market values of its
quickly marketable assets. It may be palatable during a depres"' Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and*Exchange Commission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 317, 340 (1941) (emphasis supplied). It is true that at the
time the statement in question was published Frank had left the SEC and had
been appointed a federal judge. However, the article apparently was written while
he was Chairman of the SEC and at the beginning of the article it is noted that
"[s]ince the writing of this article Mr. Frank has been appointed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit." The precise timing here, however, is not important. It is clear from the article itself that Frank was expounding the views of
the Commission, whether or not he was technically in a position officially to speak
for it. The remark of Samuel Clark quoted in note 31 of Billyou's article is not
necessarily at variance with Frank's statement. Clark said: "[T]he law requires that a plan provide recognition for claims in the order of their priority;
that such recognition must approximate full payment in the order of priorities,
either in cash or in securities of the reorganized company ... ." He did not go on
to consider whether full payment in securities of the reorganized company required
valuing those securities at "market value" or the value which the securities could
reasonably be expected to attain.
a5 Billyou, supra note i, at 589 n.zIo.
" Central States Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 195o).
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